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In this paper, we compare ad valorem and specific taxation under het-
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1 Introduction
In the business community many firms charge consumers a single price (uniform
pricing), but whenever it is feasible they will apply more sophisticated pricing
strategies to increase profit. For instance, they might require consumers to pay
a fee up front for the right to buy a product or service. Consumers then pay
an additional fee (price) for each unit of the product they consume. Some firms
charge consumers according to a single two part tariff, while some firms offer
consumers a menu of tariffs and charge usage according to the individually cho-
sen tariff. In both cases, the firm is said to apply a nonlinear pricing strategy,
because the average price paid per unit depends on the total size of a consumer’s
purchases.1 For example, mobile phone companies charge customers a monthly
fixed fee plus a fee for message units (or calls) and offer menus of such two part
tariffs. The same pricing strategy is extensively used throughout the telecommu-
nications industry. Banks require credit card holders to pay an annual fee plus a
percentage fee on the credit used. Clubs such as dating clubs, sports clubs, and
golf clubs charge an annual membership fee plus a fee each time a consumer uses
their facilities or services.
Despite the fact that specific (unit) taxes and ad valorem taxes are among the
main revenue raisers in most OECD countries, very little is known about their
effect on nonlinear pricing schemes. Nor is there any knowledge about what
the optimal mix of unit and ad valorem taxes are from society’s point of view
when firms use nonlinear pricing. The difference between specific and ad valorem
taxation under nonlinear pricing is that ad valorem taxes falls both on the fixed
fee and the price per unit whereas the specific tax only falls on the quantity sold
and not on the fixed fee. In this paper we compare the tax incidence and welfare
effects of both type of taxes when a monopolist offers a menu of two part tariffs.
We show that a rise in either tax (specific or ad valorem) makes the price per unit
go up, and that an ad valorem tax is less likely to be overshifted in the sense that
1A two-part tariff increases the profit of a monopoly firm. Consumers are encouraged by a
low per unit price to make large purchases, whereas the consumers’ surpluses are extracted by
the fixed fee that is paid up-front. Menus of two-part tariffs are offered because of the existence
of demand-side heterogeneity. See Oi (1971), as well as Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin
and Riley (1984). For surveys on nonlinear pricing see Wilson (1993) and Stole (2005).
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the price per unit to consumers rises by more than the tax increase. Ad valorem
taxes, therefore, hurts consumers less than unit taxes. Although the sign of how
a tax change affects the fixed fee cannot be uniquely determined, we find that
the fixed fee most likely will fall following a rise in either tax. We also show
that tax incidence under nonlinear pricing is much more complex than under
uniform pricing. Under nonlinear pricing, consumers reveal their true willingness
to pay only when they have the incentive to do so, i.e., if they obtain the same
or larger utility by choosing the tariff intended for his demand type instead of
choosing the tariff intended for a type with lower willingness to pay. Thus, if
the firm increases the price for one consumer type it must also increase the price
for the adjacent type to secure that all consumers continue to reveal their true
type through the choice of tariff. We find that under nonlinear pricing a tax can
be shifted differently across consumers and a tax change affects the whole set of
menus offered by the firm. This is in contrast to uniform pricing where the issue
of whether a tax is over- or undershifted depends on the curvature of the demand
function.
A second set of results pertains to the welfare and tax revenue effects of specific
and ad valorem taxes. If the government changes the mix of taxes so that the
firm’s behavior is unchanged, a pure system of ad valorem taxation generates
higher tax revenue than does a pure system of specific taxation. Ad valorem taxes,
therefore are more efficient in raising tax revenue. Furthermore, a tax reform that
is designed to leave tax revenues at the initial tariff menu unchanged, leads to a
lower price per unit, but a higher fixed fee for all consumers. Such a reform also
increases market coverage, yields higher profit and generates a larger consumer
surplus, hence, it must also generate higher tax revenue. The policy insight from
such a reform, then, is that the ad valorem tax strictly Pareto dominates the
specific tax under a menu of two-part tariffs.
In order to bring forward these results we study study a monopolist firm which
supplies a single good to consumers who are identical except for their marginal
willingness to pay for the monopolist’s product. The firm’s problem is to design a
menu of two-part tariffs (each consisting of a fixed fee and a price per unit), such
that all consumers find it individually rational to select the tariff that is intended
for his or her type, given that individual willingness to pay is private information
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to the consumer.2 Real world examples of nonlinear pricing by means of two part
tariffs are often characterized by firms offering consumers a limited menu of two
part tariffs. In our model we assume that the monopoly firm offers a continuum
of two part tariffs. This simplifies the analysis but yields qualitatively the same
results as if the model contained a discrete number of tariffs.
Our analysis relates to a substantial literature that compares specific taxes to
ad valorem taxes under uniform pricing.3 Suits and Musgrave (1953) finds that
ad valorem taxation yields a larger total surplus than unit taxes provided they
the give the same yield. Skeath and Trandel (1994) shows that ad valorem taxes
Pareto dominate specific taxes. More recently, Delipalla and Keen (1992) com-
pare ad valorem to specific taxes in models of oligopoly and show that ad valorem
taxes imply a lower consumer price, higher tax revenue, and lower profits (if entry
is precluded) than specific taxes. All these studies are undertaken in a framework
where a firm is charging consumers a single price (linear pricing).
Studies that compares unit taxes and ad valorem taxes under nonlinear pricing
are scant. Damus (1981) finds that taxation distorts the profit maximizing be-
havior of firms using two-part tariffs. His analysis does not make an attempt
to distinguish and compare unit and ad valorem taxation nor to study tax in-
cidence. Cheung (1998) compares ad valorem to unit taxes examining first-,
second, and third degree price discrimination, and finds that under any of these
pricing schemes ad valorem taxes Pareto dominates unit taxes. The price struc-
ture in Cheung (1998) represents average prices and his focus is on the direction
of output changes following a tax change. Our analysis distinguishes itself from
the two above in that it uses a general two part pricing model to examine and
compare tax incidence and welfare effects under ad valorem and unit taxes.
In Section 2, we outline the basic model that incorporates indirect taxation. In
Section 3, we focus on the isolated effects of a change in either the ad valorem tax
or the specific tax on the individual fixed fee and the price per unit. In Section
2In standard mechanism design theory the constraints on the firm’s maximization problem
are referred to as the incentive compatibility constraint and the participation constraint of each
consumer. See e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, ch. 7).
3Comparison of ad valorem and unit taxes dates back to Cournot (1960) and Wicksell (1959).
More recently Suits and Musgrave (1953), Cournot (1960) and Wicksell (1959) study indirect
taxation and tax incidence under monopoly. A survey of the tax incidence literature is given
in Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) whilst Keen (1998) surveys specific and ad valorem taxation.
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4, we examine an output-neutral shift from specific to ad valorem taxation and
we investigate how this affects tax revenues. In Section 5, we investigate the
effects on tariff menu and welfare of a tax-revenue-neutral shift from specific to
ad valorem taxation. In Section 6 we offer some concluding remarks.
2 Nonlinear pricing with indirect taxation
The model we use is one with a monopoly firm producing and selling a single good
at constant marginal cost c to many consumers. The consumers differ in their
willingness to pay for the good and their differences in taste are defined by a single
dimensional parameter θ, which can be interpreted as a quantity-type parameter
(the higher is θ, the larger is demand at any given tariff). The monopoly firm
offers a menu of two-part tariffs to the consumers, where p is the unit price of
the good and A denotes the fixed fee a consumer must pay in order to purchase
the desired quantity q. We study a Bayesian game in which the monopolist first
chooses a menu of two-part tariffs. Each consumer subsequently selects at most
one tariff from the menu. If the consumer selects a tariff {p,A}, he or she pays
pq + A for q units of the good. It should be made clear at the outset that we
will consider a continuum of two-part tariffs and we shall therefore use the terms
two-part tariffs and nonlinear pricing interchangeably.
A consumer derives utility according to the quasilinear utility function
U =
{
u(q, θ)− pq − A, if q > 0
0, otherwise,
where u(q, θ) is the gross surplus and pq + A is the monetary transfer from the
consumer to the monopolist.
We assume that u(q, θ) is increasing and concave in q for finite values of q, that
u(0, θ) = 0 and that it is increasing in θ for all values of θ. We impose the standard
Single Crossing condition that prevents the demand curves of two different types
of consumer from crossing. This amounts to assuming that uqθ > 0. Furthermore,
in order to ensure the existence of a unique solution for consumers’ choices q(p, θ)
for a per unit price equal to marginal cost we use the standard assumptions that
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uq(∞, θ) ≡ limq→∞ uq(q, θ) ≤ 0 and uq(0, θ) ≡ limq→0 uq(q, θ) c.4
Since the utility function is quasilinear, the demand function maximizes the con-
sumer surplus, and the area under the demand curve is a consumer’s gross surplus
measured in monetary terms. High demand types have larger consumer surplus
for a given per usage fee than low demand types, indicating that the firm can
charge them a higher fixed fee. The monopolist has prior beliefs about the dis-
tribution of types, θ ∈ [θ, θ]. This distribution is described by a cumulative
distribution function F (θ) that is differentiable. The corresponding density func-
tion, f(θ), is strictly positive on the support.
A consumer of type θ who maximizes utility subject to a tariff of T = pq + A,
chooses an optimal amount equal to q(p, θ), and receives indirect utility
v(p, θ)− A =
∫ ∞
p
q(z, θ)dz − A.
The monopolist wishes to separate consumers whose willingness to pay differs by
offering a continuous menu of two-part tariffs given by {p(θ), A(θ)}θ∈[θ∗,θ], where
[θ∗, θ] is the market coverage of the firm, and θ∗ denotes the consumer that is
just indifferent between making a purchase or not.5 If the monopolist serves the
whole market (all types) then θ∗ = θ. Otherwise the last consumer being served
(cut-off type) is θ∗ > θ.
The tariff menu {p(θ), A(θ)} must be designed such that each type θ chooses
the tariff intended for his or her type, and such that each type θ ≥ θ∗ finds it
individually rational to accept the tariff rather than not participate and receive
the reservation utility of zero. Hence, the firm maximizes profit subject to a set of
incentive compatibility constraints and a set of individual rationality constraints
(participation constraints). In equilibrium, a type-θ consumer chooses the tariff
intended for him. Let V (θ, θ) ≡ V (θ) denote the equilibrium utility level he or
4The canonical version of the simple model that is presented in this paper can be found in
Tirole (1988, ch 3.5), and in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, ch 7). See Wilson (1993) on nonlinear
pricing by a monopolist; see Rochet and Stole (2003) for a guide to the screening literature; and
see Stole (2005) for a comprehensive guide to the literature on price discrimination in models
that incorporate competition.
5Note that the tariff menu will depend not only on θ, but also on the taxes in question. We
will introduce these parameters when we characterize the optimal tariff menu.
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she enjoys when he or she chooses the tariff intended for him or her; that is,
V (θ) = v(p(θ), θ)− A(θ) (1)
When a consumer of type θ chooses some arbitrary tariff {p(θ′), A(θ′)}, the net
utility is V (θ, θ′′), θ)− A(θ′). Thus, for all θ, the constraints are
v(p(θ), θ)− A(θ) ≥ 0,
v(p(θ), θ)− A(θ) ≥ v(p(θ′), θ)− A(θ′).
Given our assumptions, it is well known from the mechanism design literature
that the full set of participation and incentive constraints can be replaced by the
following two constraints:
A(θ) = v(p(θ), θ)− V (θ), ∀ θ ∈ [θ∗, θ¯] (2)
V (θ) =
∫ θ
θ∗
vθ(p(u), u)du, ∀ θ ∈
[
θ∗, θ¯
]
(3)
together with p(θ) being monotonically nonincreasing over the type space.6 Since
the incentive constraint requires that −q(p(θ), θ)p′(θ) = A′(θ) we know that the
fixed fee must be nondecreasing over the type space. When the firm offers the
menu {p(θ), A(θ)}, the profit function is
Π =
∫ θ
θ∗
[
((1− tv)p(θ)− ts − c)q(p(θ), θ) + (1− tv)A(θ)
]
f(θ)dθ, (4)
where tv is an ad valorem tax, ts a specific tax, θ
∗ is the cut-off type, and
{p(θ), A(θ)} satisfies equations (2) and (3).
It should be made clear that we follow the conventional definition of specific
taxes and value added taxes in that the former falls on what constitutes one
unit of the good sold whereas the value added tax falls on the total value of
the transaction undertaken. Specific taxes are taxes on special characteristics
of commodities (here volume) leaving untaxed some characteristics of the good
6This is a standard result in these types of models, and a proof can be found in Fudenberg
and Tirole (1991, chapter 7) or Tirole (1988, chapter 3.5)). A sketch is given in Appendix A.
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(such as the pleasures of an amusement park, say); ad valorem taxes, in contrast,
fully taxes the whole set of characteristics of a good. Therefore, ad valorem taxes
fall on both the fixed fee and the price per unit whereas the specific tax only falls
on the quantity sold, since the fixed fee is the price the consumer has to pay in
order to enter the market and is not quantity related. Obviously we could have
allowed hybrid tax systems where the ad valorem tax falls on the fixed fee and
the specific tax on the number of transactions, but we do not do this since the
purpose at hand here is to investigate these two tax schemes in the same spirit
as previous studies under uniform pricing.
Substituting (2) and (3) into (4) and integrating by parts, we can rewrite the
profit function as
Π =
∫ θ
θ∗
(1− tv)
[
(p(θ)− φ)q(p(θ), θ) + v(p(θ), θ)− 1−F (θ)
f(θ)
vθ(p(θ), θ)
]
f(θ)dθ, (5)
where φ ≡ (ts + c) / (1− tv) is the effective marginal cost per unit. The term
under the integrand is the firm’s ‘virtual profit’ and is defined as pi(p(θ), θ, ts, tv).
Maximization of (5) requires pointwise maximization for each consumer type (θ)
and yields the following pricing rule:7
p(θ) = φ+
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
(
vθp
−vpp
)
. (6)
The solution in p to equation (6) gives the price per unit p = p(θ, ts, tv). For
each type, this should be equal to the effective marginal cost plus a correction
term. The correction term is the inverse hazard rate of F (θ) multiplied by a
fraction that represents the trade-off between the informational rent and the
consumer’s marginal willingness to pay the entrance fee (that is, (vθp/− vpp)).
7As is standard, we assume that the second-order conditions for this maximization problem
are satisfied. The second-order condition for global incentive compatibility is that the per unit
charge is decreasing in θ. This condition is satisfied when the firm’s marginal profit is decreasing
in θ (that is, when ∂2pi(p(θ), θ, ts, tv)/∂p∂θ < 0). One necessary condition for this is that the
distribution F (θ) satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition, which is a standard assumption
in the nonlinear pricing literature. It specifies that the hazard rate of the distribution, f(θ)1−F (θ) ,
is increasing in θ, and that the inverse hazard rate, 1−F (θ)f(θ) , is not increasing.
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The numerator, (vθp), indicates how the price per unit affects the information
rent for the type that is just above θ, whereas the denominator, (−vpp), measures
how the price per unit affects the surplus of consumer type θ. The full correction
term is therefore the marginal cost of revealing private information held by the
consumer, which is the cost of screening.
An alternative way of expressing the pricing rule is to use a variant of the Lerner
index of monopoly power, as follows:
p− φ
p
=
[
1− F (θ)
θf(θ)
]
Eθ
E
,
where Eθ = qθ (θ/q) > 0 and E = −qp (p/q) > 0 are the elasticities of demand
with respect to θ and p, respectively. The Lerner index under uniform pricing
is given by (pUP − φ)/pUP = 1/Eˆ where Eˆ is the elasticity of demand in terms
of aggregate demand. Different from the standard interpretation of the Lerner
index under uniform pricing is the presence of the demand elasticity with respect
to consumer type, weighted by the price elasticity. As in standard theory with
uniform pricing the more price sensitive the consumers, the lower is the mark-up
over marginal cost. On the other hand, the larger the elasticity of demand with
respect to consumer type at a given price, the larger is the mark-up.
If the firm has perfect information about each consumer’s valuation there is no
information rent to consider and the last term in the bracket in (5) vanishes
and p = φ for θ¯. If consumer valuations are private information, it follows from
equation (6 ) that p > φ for every consumer except for the one with the highest
demand (F (θ¯) = 1). The correction term, then, shows that the informational
cost pertaining to any given consumer θ is higher for low-demand types under
the assumption that the inverse hazard rate is nonincreasing in θ. This means
that the firm may profit by distorting the price per unit to the extent that it
excludes some low-demand types from the market. When the solution to (6)
implies negative outcomes with respect to individual demands, q(p(θ, ts, tv), θ),
these types are not served. The critical value for market coverage is
q(p(θ∗, ts, tv), θ
∗) = 0. (7)
Hence, the firm excludes consumers in the interval θ ∈ [θ, θ∗].
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3 Tax incidence under nonlinear pricing
In this section, we focus on how a change in either the ad valorem tax or the
specific tax affects firm behavior, as well as producer and consumer surplus.
For clarity of exposition, we let the elasticity of the slope qp(p, θ) with respect to
p be defined by εp, and let the elasticity of the slope qθ(p, θ) with respect to p be
defined by εθ. Concerning the second order derivative of the demand function we
assume that it is convex, that is qpp ≥ 0, whereas qpθ R 0. Hence, we define
εp(p, θ) ≡ qppp
qp
≤ 0, εθ(p, θ) ≡ qpθp
qθ
R 0.
An important issue in what follows is who bears the economic burden of the tax.
Is the tax passed on to the consumer or the producer or is it shared between
them? The standard definition in the literature on tax incidence is that a specific
tax is ‘overshifted’ if dp/dts > 1 in the absence of a preexisting ad valorem tax,
whereas an ad valorem tax is overshifted if dp/dtv > p; that is, if the percentage
increase in the price exceeds the percentage rise in the tax. Similarly, we use the
term ‘undershifted’ to describe dp/dts < 1 and dp/dtv < p. In what follows, we
concentrate on how the fee structures across types of consumer are affected by
changes in either tax.
In order to see how the incentives for tax shifting onto the per unit price differ
under uniform pricing and a two-part tariff, we differentiate equation (6) and
obtain the expression measuring the tax incidence under specific taxation as
follows:
dp
dts
=
dφ
dts
[
1 + L(θ)
(
εp − εθ
)]−1
, (8)
where L(θ) is the Lerner index under nonlinear pricing as defined in Section 2.
Note that the concavity of the profit function prevents dp/dts from being negative.
If the term in the squared bracket in (8) is larger than unity, ts is overshifted.
The question of overshifting or undershifting, thus, depends entirely on the size
of εp and εθ, whereas the size of the shift depends on the mark-up as well.
For comparison, the effect of a change in the specific tax on the usage fee under
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uniform pricing is given by
dpUP
dts
=
dφ
dts
[
1 + LUP
(
Eˆ + εˆp
)]−1
, (9)
where εˆp and Eˆ are defined in terms of aggregate demand rather than in terms
of type-dependent demand functions, and LUP is the (constant across all individ-
uals) Lerner index under uniform pricing. The condition for overshifting under
monopoly and uniform pricing (all consumers face the same price) are well known
in the public finance litterature and can be summarized as follows
Lemma 1 Under uniform pricing, concave demand will always give undershift-
ing, whereas overshifting occurs if the demand function is sufficiently convex,
that is, if the elasticity of the demand curve (Eˆ) at pUP is lower than minus the
elasticity of the slope of the demand curve (εˆp) at p
UP .8
Under a menu of two part tariffs there is in addition to the curvature of the
demand function the issue of incentive compatibility to take into account when
analyzing conditions for tax incidence. Recall that the individuals are charged
a type dependent per unit charge p(θ), which is set to maximize the revenue
net of cost for each individual minus the informational rent required to induce
the consumer to choose the tariff intended for him. Therefore, if the monopolist
increases the price for one consumer of type θ, it has to increase the price for the
adjacent type just below θ as well in order to restore the incentive compatibility
constraint. Hence, the monopolist will not only take into account that an increase
in the per unit charge p(θ) changes this type’s demand, but also that the demand
for the adjacent type will change as well. These effects are captured by εp and εθ
respectively.
Equation (8) states the tax incidence under non-linear pricing and specific taxa-
tion. Accordingly, the incidence of the ad valorem tax under non-linear pricing
can be written as
dp
dtv
= φ
dp
dts
. (10)
8Note that the restriction on the slope of the demand curve (εˆp) takes into account the
curvature of the demand curve.
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The discussion above has made it clear that the effect of a change in either tax
depends can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1 The price per unit p(θ, ts, tv) increases for all consumers follow-
ing an increase in either tv or ts.
(a) For the consumer who is most willing to pay (has the highest θ), a one-
percent increase in the tax is shifted onto the consumer by a one-percent
increase in the price per unit.
(b) For consumer types in [θ∗, θ), an increase in ts is overshifted if εθ (p, θ) >
εp (p, θ), and undershifted if εθ (p, θ) < εp (p, θ).
(c) If an ad valorem tax is overshifted, then a specific tax will also be overshifted.
The converse, however, is not true.
Proof. See Appendix B for a proof of Proposition 1.
Equations (8) and (10) as well as result (a) and (b) in Proposition 1 show very
clearly that the tax incidence conditions differ from those under uniform pricing
and now relate to the combined effects of incentive compatibility and curvature
of demand characteristics.
In order to further make clear the difference between the two pricing schemes,
note from (8) that under non-linear pricing a specific tax is overshifted if the
elasticity with respect to p of the slope qθ is larger than the elasticity with re-
spect to p of the slope qθ (εθ > εp). This differs from uniform pricing, where a
specific tax in overshifted if the demand curve is sufficiently convex (otherwise
it is undershifted). Furthermore, it is well known under uniform pricing that a
linear demand function implies that 50% of a specific tax increase is passed on
to the consumer price. In contrast, linear demand under nonlinear pricing means
that a specific tax is overshifted if qpθ > 0, i.e., if the slope of the demand func-
tion is steeper for consumer types with larger willingness to pay, i.e., for larger
θ. Moreover, if the slope of the demand curve is the same across types, a tax
increase is always overshifted for convex demand, and always undershifted for
concave demand. Result (c) is, however, in line with findings of tax incidence
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under uniform pricing both under monopoly and oligopoly models (see Delipalla
and Keen (1992)).
Proposition 1 has made clear the incidence on the unit price (p), and we now
turn to examine the effects of taxation on the fixed fee (A). The tax incidence
for the specific and ad valorem tax, respectively, are given by (the full derivation
is relegated to Appendix C)
dA
dts
= −q (p (θ, ts, tv) , θ) dp
dts
−
∫ θ
θ∗
vθp (p (u, ts, tv) , u)
dp
dts
du, (11)
and
dA
dtv
= φ
dA
dts
. (12)
The effect of an increase in either tax rate on the fixed fee can be decomposed into
its impact on the consumer’s gross surplus and its effect on the information rent.
The gross surplus falls following a rise in the tax rate and, ceteris paribus, this
suggest that A should fall. However, the rise in either tax rate also reduces the
information rent and this effect taken in isolation suggests that A should go up.
The relative magnitudes of these two effects, then, are opposing. From equation
(11) it is clear that the fixed fee is nonincreasing for the very lowest type, θ∗.
The change in the incidence on the fixed fee for a θ > θ∗ is determined by
(i)
d2A
dtsdθ
= −
[
qp
dp
dts
dp
dθ
]
−
[
q
d2p
dtsdθ
]
, (ii)
d2A
dtvdθ
= φ
d2A
dtsdθ
. (13)
If d2A/dtsdθ < 0 over the entire type space, the fixed fee is nonincreasing for all
types above θ∗. The first squared bracket in (i) is positive from Proposition 1
and the global incentive compatibility condition so the sign of d2A/dtsdθ depends
of the sign and magnitude of the second bracketed term in (i). In the remainder
of this section we assume for simplicity that θ is uniform on a unit length
interval. This assumption does not affect the results to follow, but simplifies the
calculations leading to them. By rewriting expression 13(i) it can be shown that
d2A/dtsdθ ≤ 0 if (
2
dp
dts
+
E
εp
− 1
)
dp
dθ
+
qpθ
qpp
≥ 0 (14)
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We may now state the following proposition
Proposition 2 The effect on the fixed fee is summarized as follows:
(a) The fixed fee is always nonincreasing in ts and tv for the consumer that is
just indifferent between making a purchase or not (θ∗).
(b) If a specific tax is undershifted onto the per unit price, the fixed fee is
nonincreasing for the consumer with the highest demand (θ¯).
(c) If the demand curve is linear (qpp = 0) or if
dp
dts
≤ 1
2
, the fixed fee A(θ, ts, tv)
is strictly decreasing in ts and tv for all θ ∈ (θ∗, θ].
(d) If dp
dts
≥ 1
2
and the demand curve is convex, the result in (c) holds provided
that E−εp is sufficiently large.
Part (a) of Proposition 2 can be verified by inspection of (11) and (12). Part
(b)-(d) is proved in Appendix C.
Proposition 2 shows that the effect on consumer surplus dominates the informa-
tion rent effect for a large set of demand specifications. Consequently, the fixed
fee falls in order to restore the participation constraint. Any change that goes
beyond the scope of restoring the participation constraint cannot be optimal be-
cause such changes imply that profit was not maximized at the initial level. In
principle, the firm could shift a tax increase onto both the usage fee and the fixed
fee, but it chooses in most cases instead to increase the usage fee and reduce the
fixed fee.9 The reason is that the firm has two instruments at its disposal. The
primary role of the price per unit is to separate consumers, whereas the fixed fee
is an instrument that is used to extract the residual consumer surplus subject to
the participation and incentive constraints. The first-order condition (6) shows
that a rise in either tax rate increases the effective marginal cost of the firm and
makes the firm increase its usage fee.
9This is evident from inspection of equation (14) and includes for instance all quadratic and
log-linear utility functions.
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4 An output-neutral shift from specific to ad
valorem taxation
The purpose of this section is to compare how tax revenue changes if the govern-
ment switches from a wholly ad valorem tax system to a system of wholly specific
taxation, given that the allocation of the good or service across consumers is the
same under both tax systems (i.e., the per unit charges and fixed fees are kept
constant). It is well known in the public finance literature that for any given
specific tax ts, there exists some ad valorem tax tv such that the firm’s profit,
output, and the consumer surplus are equal. In our case the pricing rule implied
by (6) shows that the allocation of the good or service across consumers is the
same under specific and ad valorem taxation if
c+ ts =
c
1− tv .
This expression corresponds to an output-neutral tax mix under uniform pricing.
Let tax revenues be RV and RS, respectively, under a pure ad valorem tax system
(wholly ad valorem tax) and under a pure specific tax system (wholly specific
tax). We use the superscripts TP and UP to denote tax revenues under a menu
of two-part tariffs and under uniform prices respectively. A comparison of the
tax revenues under wholly ad valorem and wholly specific taxation yields the
following proposition.
Proposition 3 A wholly ad valorem tax system that generates the same price per
unit and fixed fee profiles as does a wholly specific tax system generates higher tax
revenue. Furthermore, maximum tax revenue is higher under a menu of two-part
tariffs than under a uniform price; that is,
RTPV −RTPS > RUPV −RUPS > 0.
Proof. The full set of calculations is given in Appendix D. A proof of RUPV −
RUPS > 0 is given in Suits and Musgrave (1953) and Skeath and Trandel (1994).
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In the Appendix, we show that
RUPV −RUPS = tvΠUP , (15)
where ΠUP is maximized profit under uniform pricing, and
RTPV −RTPS = tvΠTP , (16)
where ΠTP is maximized profit under nonlinear pricing. It follows from the
profit maximization hypothesis that if uniform pricing is an available option for
the firm, it will use a menu of two part tariffs only when this generates higher
profit than uniform pricing. Thus, when nonlinear pricing is used, it follows that(
RTPV −RTPS
)
= tvΠ
TP > tvΠ
UP =
(
RUPV −RUPS
)
.
Proposition 3 makes it clear that targeted tax revenue can be attained with lower
per unit charges for every consumer under ad valorem taxation compared to spe-
cific taxation. From this conclusion also follows the insight that market coverage
is larger under a wholly ad valorem tax, and that a nonlinear pricing scheme is
more efficient in terms of extracting consumer surplus and leads to higher profit
and higher tax revenue than does uniform pricing. From the perspective of the
government, the ad valorem tax, therefore, is to be preferred since it is more
efficient at raising tax revenue.
5 A tax-revenue-neutral shift from specific to
ad valorem taxation
Given that a wholly ad valorem system of taxation is preferable to wholly specific
tax system when tax revenue is concerned, a natural follow up question is if wel-
fare can be increased by placing more emphasis on the ad valorem tax in a system
of mixed taxation. We follow closely the analysis in Delipalla and Keen (1992)
and focus on a tax reform that, while not fully tax revenue neutral in general,
has no “first round” effect on tax revenue. In particular, if the firm implements
the tariff menu {p(θ, ts, tv), A(θ, ts, tv)}, which implies market coverage of [θ∗, θ],
15
tax revenue is
R =
∫ θ
θ∗
[(
tvp(θ, ts, tv) + ts
)
q(p(θ, ts, tv), θ) + tvA(θ, ts, tv)
]
f(θ)dθ.
Thus, tax revenue is given by R (ts, tv)=R (ts, tv, p(θ, ts, tv), A(θ, ts, tv), θ
∗ (ts, tv)),
and a reform with no first-round effect on tax revenue at the initial tariff menu
satisfies the condition that
dR (ts, tv) =
dR
dts
dts +
dR
dtv
dtv = 0 ⇔ −dts = dR/dtv
dR/dts
dtv.
To be more precise, the tax reform is given by the rule
p¯dtv = −dts (17)
where p¯ is the average revenue per unit across total production.
The reform in question, then, is one which alters the mix of taxes by tilting the
balance towards ad valorem taxation. As shown in Propositions 1 and 2, the firm
responds to the change in tax mix by altering its tariff menu. The real effects of
such a reform are:
Proposition 4 A tax reform that shifts taxation from specific to ad valorem tax,
but has no first-round effects on tax revenues has the effects that:
(a) It lowers the price per unit and increases the fixed fee for all consumers;
(b) It increases market coverage, the consumer surplus, and tax revenues;
(c) It has a neutral effect on the firm’s profit.
It follows from Proposition 4 that we may state:
Corollary 1 An ad valorem tax weakly Pareto dominates a specific tax.
Proof. See Appendix E for a proof of Proposition 4 and Corollary 1.
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Proposition 4 shows that changes in indirect taxes affect a monopoly using a
nonlinear price scheme qualitatively in the same way as a monopoly setting a
uniform price. The mechanisms at play are well known from previous studies
and a discussion of these is therefore omitted here (see e.g. Skeath and Trandel
(1994)). The preference for ad valorem taxation under a uniform price is known
to be due to the multiplier effect. Because a price increase raises government tax
revenue, a targeted one-percent increase in the producer price implies that the
consumer price must rise by more than one percent. To see this, let pn be the
price received by the producer and let p be the consumer price per unit. Then,
pn = (1− tv) p − ts. Totally differentiating this relationship with respect to pn
and p yields
dp
dpn
= 1/ (1− tv) > 1.
Hence, a firm that wants to increase its producer price by one percent must
increase the price charged to consumers by more than one percent (1/ (1− tv) >
1). If there is no ad valorem tax but only a specific tax, there is a one-to-one
relationship between the increases in the producer and consumer prices.
The multiplier effect under nonlinear pricing must account for the fact that a
change in the per unit charge in a given consumer’s tariff must be followed by a
change in the fixed fee in order to satisfy the incentive constraint. For a given
consumer type θ, revenue per unit to the producer, (p¯n(θ)), consists of the usage
fee and the fixed fee as follows:
p¯n(θ) = (1− tv) p(θ)− ts + (1− tv)α(p(θ), θ)v (p(θ), θ)
q (p(θ), θ)
,
where 0 ≤ α(p(θ), θ)) ≤ 1 is a proxy for the monopolist’s ability to capture the
surplus of the consumer, v(p(θ), θ), by use of the fixed fee. We can show that
dp(θ)
dp¯n(θ)
=
1
1− tv
[
1
1− α+ E
εv
(
α′p
(
q
−qp
)
+ α
)] ≡ 1
1− tvΦ(p(θ), θ), (18)
where E ≡ −qpp/q is the price elasticity of demand and εv ≡ −vpp/v is the
elasticity of the consumer surplus with respect to p. Equation (18) shows that the
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multiplier effect under nonlinear pricing is equal to that under uniform pricing,
namely 1/(1− tv). Although Φ varies over the type space, the presence of an ad
valorem tax tv > 0 creates a multiplier effect also under nonlinear pricing, which
is the driving force for the difference between ad valorem and specific taxation.
6 Conclusion
The focal point in this paper has been on how indirect taxation affects a monopoly
firm that uses a nonlinear pricing scheme, and where the willingness to pay for
the product sold is private information to the consumer. It is well known that the
firm’s optimal response to such information asymmetry is to introduce a price-
cost distortion in the per unit price to balance the trade-off between extracting
consumer surplus from low-demand consumers through lower per unit charges,
and extracting informational rents from high-demand consumers through higher
fixed fees. In the paper we show how indirect taxation affects this trade-off. We
show that the price per unit rises following a tax increase (specific or ad valorem),
and that the rise in the unit price differs substantially across consumers depending
on their willingness to pay for the good sold. The effect on the fixed fee of a change
in either tax rate is in general ambiguous, but for plausible assumptions (such
as quadratic and log-linear utility functions, for example), the fixed fee will fall.
We find tax incidence under nonlinear pricing to be more complex than under
uniform pricing. In the latter case the shape of the demand function determines if
a tax is over- or undershifted, say. Under nonlinear pricing, the incidence analysis
is more complex. The reason is that a change in the per unit charge towards a
specific consumer interferes with her incentive to reveal her true willingness to
pay, unless there is a simultaneous change in the fixed fee or in the tariff offered to
an adjacent type. In response, a monopoly firm will change both the fixed fee that
is charged to her, as well as the per per unit price that is charged to the adjacent
consumer type. Thus, if the firm increases the price for one consumer type it
must also increase the price for the adjacent type to secure that all consumers
continue to reveal their true type through the choice of tariff.
Our study also shows that the presumption in favor of ad valorem taxation under
linear pricing extends to nonlinear pricing. If the government changes the mix
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of taxes without the behavior of the firm being affected, a wholly ad valorem
taxation system generates higher tax revenue than does a system of wholly specific
taxes. Furthermore, a tax reform that places more emphasis on ad valorem
taxation and does not have first round effects on tax revenue, leads to a lower
price per unit and (most likely) increases the fixed fee for all consumers. Such
a reform broadens market coverage, increases profits, tax revenue, and consumer
surplus. These effects are greater under ad valorem taxation, so the ad valorem
tax Pareto dominates a specific tax.
Our results may not be robust to changes in the characterization of imperfect
competition, although it is a fact that the literature on uniform pricing finds that
the presumption in favor of the ad valorem tax is still valid (see Delipalla and
Keen (1992)). A further issue that has been omitted here is the choice of product
quality. As shown by Kay and Keen (1983, 1991), the optimal balance between
ad valorem and specific taxes then depends on the precise form of consumer
preferences. This may well be the case in a setting of non-linear pricing, but
additional conditions may apply as well.
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Appendix
A Implementable two-part tariffs
Instead of assuming that consumers choose a tariff, consider the case in which a
consumer announces a type θ′ and is offered a tariff contingent on this announce-
ment, {p(θ′), A(θ′)}. Given this mechanism, a consumer of type θ maximizes
utility with respect to a type announcement.
θ ∈ argmax
θ′
{v(p(θ′), θ)− A(θ′)}.
Hence, −qp′(θ) = A′(θ) and there must be an inverse relationship between p(θ)
and A(θ), in which case the firm can increase the fixed fee if the per usage fee is
decreased. The mechanism is locally incentive compatible if a consumer type θ
is not tempted to report a type marginal below his or her true type. The local
incentive compatibility constraint is derived by applying the envelope theorem as
follows:
∂V
∂θ
= vθ(p(θ), θ).
The second-order condition for the choice of report θ′ is that Vθ′θ′(θ, θ) < 0.
Differentiating the first-order condition Vθ′(θ, θ) = 0 with respect to θ yields
Vθ′θ′(θ, θ) = −Vθ′θ(θ, θ). Hence, a sufficient condition for global incentive com-
patibility is that −q(p(θ), θ)dp
dθ
> 0. Consequently, for a tariff menu to be imple-
mentable, p(θ) must be decreasing and A(θ) must be increasing. Integrating the
local incentive constraint yields
V (θ) = V (θ∗) +
∫ θ
θ∗
vθ(p(u), u)du.
When V (θ∗) = 0, the participation and incentive constraints in equations (2)
and (3), together with p′(θ) < 0, guarantee that the constraints are satisfied
globally as well as locally. The monotonicity condition, p′(θ) < 0, is ignored in
the optimization; instead we must check that it is satisfied.
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B Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 can be verified by differentiating the first-order condition
pip (p (θ, ts, tv) , θ, ts, tv) = 0 (that is, (6)) with respect to p and ts to verify parts
(a) and (b), and with respect to p and tv to verify part (c). We find that
dp
dts
= qp
1
pipp
> 0.
Because the firm’s marginal cost is given by φ = (c+ ts)/(1− tv), a tax increase
is overshifted if dp/dts > dφ/dts. Part (a) and (b) can be verified by inspecting
equation (8), remembering that L(θ¯) = 0 and L(θ) > 0 ∀ θ ∈ [θ∗, θ¯).
The effect on the per unit charge of a marginal increase in the ad valorem tax
rate is
dp
dtv
= φqp
1
pipp
= φ
dp
dts
> 0.
An ad valorem tax is overshifted if dp/dtv > p, that is if, φ(dp/dts) > p. Since
p > φ an ad valorem tax is less likely to be overshifted.
C Proof of Proposition 2
The total derivative of A with respect to ts is
dA
dts
= vp (p (θ, ts, tv) , θ)
dp
dts
+ vθ (p (θ
∗, ts, tv) , θ
∗)
dθ∗
dts
−
∫ θ
θ∗
vθp (p (u, ts, tv) , u)
dp
dts
du
Notice that the term vθ (p (θ
∗, ts, tv) , θ
∗) dθ
∗
dts
is zero if either θ∗ > θ, in which
case, vθ approaches zero, or θ
∗ < θ, in which case, dθ
∗
dts
is zero. The incidence
reduces to equation (11).
Part (b) of Proposition 2 is proved by the following. Another way of expressing
the incidence term follows by adding the term q(p(θ, ts, tv), θ)−q(p(θ∗, ts, tv), θ∗)−
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∫ θ
θ∗ qp(p(u, ts, tv), u)
dp
dθ
du− ∫ θ
θ∗ qθ(p(u, ts, tv), u)du = 0. We get:
dA
dts
= q (p (θ, ts, tv) , θ)
(
1− dp
dts
)
− q(p(θ∗, ts, tv), θ∗)−∫ θ
θ∗
qθ (p (u, ts, tv) , u)
(
1− dp
dts
)
du−
∫ θ
θ∗
qp (p (u, ts, tv) , u)
dp
dθ
du,
When undershifting occurs following a change in ts, it follows that dA/dts is
negative at θ. When ts is overshifted the sign of dA/dts cannot be determined in
general.
Part (c) is proved by inspection of (14), from which it is seen that the right
hand side approaches zero as εp and qpp approaches zero. Hence, the change in
the fixed fee following a tax increase is nonincreasing in θ for linear demand.
Further, when dp
dts
≤ 1
2
we must have that
qpθ
qpp
< 0. Because this ensures d
2p
dtsdθ
=
qpp
pipp
[
dp
dθ
(2 dp
dts
− 1)− qpθ
qpp
]
> 0, this suffices to prove that d
2A
dtsdθ
< 0.
To confirm the last part of Proposition 2 we just need E−εp to be sufficiently large
to satisfy equation (14). 
D Calculations for Proposition 3
Here, we present all the calculations required to derive equations (15) and (16),
which are used to prove Proposition 3.
RUPV −RUPS =
∫ θ
θ∗∗
{
tv
(
pUP (ts, tv)q(p
UP (ts, tv), θ)− tsq(pUP (ts, tv), θ)
}
f(θ)dθ,
= tv
∫ θ
θ∗∗
{
pUP (ts, tv)q(p
UP (ts, tv), θ)− ts
tv
q(pUP (ts, tv), θ)
}
f(θ)dθ,
= tv
∫ θ
θ∗∗
(
pUP (ts, tv)− c1−tv
)
q(pUP (ts, tv), θ)f(θ)dθ = tvΠ
UP .
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where θ ∈ [θ∗∗, θ] is the firm’s market coverage under uniform pricing, and
pUP (ts, tv) is the uniform price that maximizes profit.
RTPV −RTPS =
∫ θ
θ∗
{
tv
(
p(θ, ts, tv)q(p(θ), θ) + A(θ, ts, tv)
)− tsq(p(θ, ts, tv), θ)}f(θ)dθ,
= tv
∫ θ
θ∗
{
p(θ, ts, tv)q(p(θ, ts, tv), θ) + A(θ)− ts
tv
q(p(θ, ts, tv), θ)
}
f(θ)dθ,
= tv
∫ θ
θ∗
(
p(θ, ts, tv) +
A(θ,ts,tv)
q(p(θ,ts,tv),θ)
− c
1− tv
)
q(p(θ, ts, tv), θ)f(θ)dθ = tvΠ
TP .
E Proof of Proposition 4
The claims in Proposition 4 can be verified by totally differentiating the endoge-
nous variables with respect to ts and tv, and by applying the tax reform rule in
(17), i.e., p¯dtv = −dts. That is, we total differentiate the equations p = p(θ, ts, tv),
A = A(θ, ts, tv), Π = Π(ts, tv), CS = CS(ts, tv), and θ
∗ = θ∗(ts, tv).
The effect on the per usage fee and on the fixed fee is given by
dp =
dp
dtv
dtv +
dp
dts
dts = φ
dp
dts
dtv − p¯ dp
dts
dtv = −
[
p¯− φ
] dp
dts
dtv < 0,
dA = −
[
p¯− φ
]dA
dts
dtv > 0.
The signs are determined by Propositions 1 and 2 including the qualifying as-
sumptions for this proposition. The remaining effects are
dθ∗ = −
[
p¯− φ
]dθ∗
dts
dtv < 0, dCS = −
[
p¯− φ
]dCS
dts
dtv > 0,
dK = −
[
p¯− φ
]dK
dts
dtv > 0, dΠ = 0.
The cutoff type is described by the equation (7), q(p(θ∗, ts, tv), θ
∗) = 0. Differen-
tiating this implicitly with respect to θ∗ and ts yields
(
qp
dp
dθ
+ qθ
)
dθ∗ + qp
dp
dts
dts = 0 ⇒ dθ
∗
dts
= −qp
dp
dts
qp
dp
dθ
+ qθ
≥ 0
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and with respect to θ∗ and tv yields
(
qp
dp
dθ
+ qθ
)
dθ∗ + qpφ
dp
dts
dtv = 0 ⇒ dθ
∗
dtv
= −φqp
dp
dts
qp
dp
dθ
+ qθ
≥ 0
Aggregate consumer surplus is
CS(ts, tv) =
∫ θ
θ∗
{∫ θ
θ∗
vθ(p(u, ts, tv), u)du
}
f(θ)dθ =
∫ θ
θ∗
vθ(p(θ, ts, tv), θ)(1−F (θ))dθ,
and
dCS
dts
= −
∫ θ
θ∗
qθ(p(θ, ts, tv), θ)
dp
dts
(1− F (θ))dθ − vθ(p(θ∗, ts, tv), θ∗)(1− F (θ∗))dθ
∗
dts
= −
∫ θ
θ∗
qθ(p(θ, ts, tv), θ)
dp
dts
(1− F (θ))dθ < 0,
dCS
dtv
= φ
dCS
dts
< 0.
Aggregate consumer expenditure is given by
K(ts, tv) =
∫ θ
θ∗
(
p(θ, ts, tv)q(p(θ, ts, tv), θ) + A(θ, ts, tv)
)
f(θ)dθ
=
∫ θ
θ∗
(
p(θ, ts, tv)q(p(θ, ts, tv), θ) + v(p(θ, ts, tv), θ)−
1−F (θ)
f(θ)
vθ(p(θ, ts, tv), θ)
)
f(θ)dθ
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and
dK
dts
=
∫ θ
θ∗
(
p(θ, ts, tv)qp(p(θ, ts, tv), θ)− 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
vθp(p(θ, ts, tv), θ)
) dp
dts
f(θ)dθ−(
p(θ∗, ts, tv)q(p(θ
∗, ts, tv), θ
∗) + A(θ∗, ts, tv)
)dθ∗
dts
=
∫ θ
θ∗
φqp(p(θ, ts, tv), θ)
dp
dts
f(θ)dθ−(
p(θ∗, ts, tv)q(p(θ
∗, ts, tv), θ
∗) + A(θ∗, ts, tv)
)dθ∗
dts
< 0,
dK
dtv
= φ
dK
dts
< 0.
To derive this expression, we have used the first-order condition.
The isolated effect of a change in the taxes on the firm’s profit Π(ts, tv) is given
by
dΠ
dts
=
∫ θ
θ∗
(
∂pi
∂ts
+
∂pi
∂p
dp
dts
)
f(θ)dθ − pi(p(θ∗, ts, tv), θ∗, ts, tv)dθ
∗
dts
,
The term pi(p(θ∗, ts, tv), θ
∗, ts, tv)dθ
∗
dts
is zero if either θ∗ > θ, in which case,
pi(p(θ∗, ts, tv), θ
∗, ts, tv) is zero, or θ
∗ < θ, in which case, dθ
∗
dts
is zero. Using this
information together with the foc ∂pi/∂p = 0 we can write
dΠ
dts
= −
∫ θ
θ∗
q(p(θ, ts, tv), θ)f(θ)dθ < 0,
dΠ
dtv
= −
∫ θ
θ∗
(
p(θ, ts, tv)q(p(θ, ts, tv), θ) + A(θ, ts, tv)
)
f(θ)dθ = p¯
dΠ
dts
where
p¯ ≡
∫ θ
θ∗
(
p(θ, ts, tv)q(p(θ, ts, tv), θ) + A(θ, ts, tv)
)
f(θ)dθ∫ θ
θ∗ q(p(θ, ts, tv), θ)f(θ)dθ
Because consumers’ aggregate expenditures increase, it follows that tax revenues
increase.
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